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Abstract 
Recent discussions among lawyers, philosophers, policy researchers and athletes have focused on the 
potential threat to privacy posed by the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) whereabouts 
requirements. These requirements demand, among other things,  that all elite athletes file their 
whereabouts information for the subsequent quarter on a quarterly basis and comprise data for one 
hour of each day when the athlete will be available and accessible for no advance notice testing at a 
specified location of their choosing. Failure to file one’s whereabouts, or the non-availability for 
testing at said location on three occasions within any 18-month period constitutes an anti-doping rule 
violation that is equivalent to testing positive to a banned substance, and may lead to a suspension of 
the athlete for a time period of between one and two years. We critically explore the extent to which 
WADA’s whereabouts requirements are in tension with existing legislation on privacy, with respect to 
UK athletes, who are simultaneously protected by UK domestic and EU law. Both UK domestic and 
EU law are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 8, which 
establishes a right to “respect for private and family life, home and correspondence”.  We critically 
discuss the centrality of the whereabouts requirements in relation to WADA’s aims, and the adoption 
and implementation of its whereabouts rules. We conclude that as WADA’s whereabouts requirements 
appear to be in breach of an elite athlete’s rights under European workers’ rights, health & safety and 
data protection law they are also, therefore, in conflict with Article 8 of the ECHR and the UK Human 
Rights Act 1998. We call for specific amendments that cater for the exceptional case of elite sports 
labour if the WADA requirements are to be considered legitimate.
Keywords:  doping, privacy, data protection, human rights.
Abstract 
Las recientes discusiones suscitadas entre juristas, filósofos, expertos en política legislativa y 
deportistas han estado centradas en la posible amenaza a la privacidad que plantea los requerimientos 
de localización de la Agencia Mundial Antidopaje (WADA). Dichos requerimientos demandan, entre 
otras cuestiones, que todos los atletas de élite pongan a disposición de ciertas autoridades la 
información relativa a su localización a lo largo de los tres meses siguientes. Dicho informe tendrá que 
repetirse cada trimestre y comprenderá la indicación de una hora de cada día en la que el deportista 
tendrá que estar disponible y accesible para, sin previo aviso, poder llevar a cabo un control en el 
lugar de su elección. La falta de indicación de la localización del atleta, así como la falta de 
disponibilidad en el lugar indicado para la ejecución de los controles en tres ocasiones seguidas dentro 
de un periodo de 18 meses,  constituye una violación a las reglas establecidas contra las prácticas de 
dopaje. Dicha situación, según los preceptos que regulan la materia, es equivalente a dar positivo en 
una prueba de consumo de una sustancia prohibida, y puede conllevar a la suspensión del deportista 
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por un periodo de tiempo que puede oscilar entre uno y dos años. Analizaremos, de forma crítica, los 
conflictos posiblemente existentes entre las previsiones de la WADA sobre requerimientos de 
localización de los deportistas británicos, con la normativa británica y europea relacionada con la 
protección de la privacidad de dichas personas. Recordemos que tanto la legislación inglesa como la 
europea están sujetas a las disposiciones que emanan del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos 
(ECHR), particularmente a lo dispuesto por el artículo 8 que establece el derecho que tiene toda 
persona al “respeto de su vida privada y familiar, de su domicilio y de su correspondencia”. Se 
discutirá  críticamente la centralidad de los requerimientos de localización en relación con los 
objetivos de la WADA, así como las cuestiones derivadas de la adopción e implementación de las 
normas relacionadas con dicho tema. Concluiremos con la idea de que, como los requerimientos de la 
WADA parecen colisionar con los derechos de los deportistas consagrados en la legislación europea 
en materia de derechos de los trabajadores, protección de la salud, seguridad e información personal, 
dichas exigencias son, también, contrarias a la previsión del artículo 8 de la ECHR, así como a la Ley 
Británica sobre Derechos Humanos de 1998. Propondremos algunas modificaciones específicas que 
podrían servir para el ajuste de dichas previsiones en los casos excepcionales del trabajo relacionado 
con los deportes de élite,  siempre y cuando los requerimientos de la WADA sean  considerados 
válidos.
Términos clave: dopaje, intimidad, protección de datos, derechos humanos.
1. WADA’s Whereabouts Requirements
The World Anti-Doping Agency  (WADA) is an international foundation established by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1999 with the mission to “promote, coordinate and 
monitor the fight  against doping in sport in all its forms”.1  Comprised in equal parts of 
representatives from the sporting movement and from world governments, its primary activities 
include scientific research, education, development of anti-doping capacities and monitoring of 
the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) – the document that  harmonizes anti-doping regulations 
in all sports and countries. While in-competition testing forms an important part of WADA’s 
monitoring activities, out-of-competition testing is seen as crucial to its success, to the extent that 
WADA specifically advocates that sports’ International Federations (IFs) with a “high risk” of 
out-of-competition doping ought to make out-of-competition testing “a priority”.2  Insofar as “a 
number of prohibited substances and methods are detectable only for a limited period of time in 
an athlete’s body while maintaining a performance-enhancing effect”, WADA views out-of-
competition testing as “one of the most powerful means of deterrence and detection of doping”.3
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2 WADA (2009) International Standard for Testing (IST), Montreal: WADA, §4.3.5.
3  WADA (2009) Q&A on Whereabouts, URL: http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-
and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/International-Standards/IST/QA-on- Whereabouts/ (accessed May 25, 2010).
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For out-of-competition testing to be effective, it is important for an IF or National Anti-
Doping Organization (NADO) not only to know where athletes are, but also to be able to test 
them during those times at which cheaters would be most likely to use prohibited substances or 
methods. To overcome the practical limitations, WADA implemented whereabouts requirements 
with their original Code in 2004, which specified the obligations of selected elite athletes (those 
belonging to so-called registered testing pools), to report their whereabouts to their relevant IF or 
NADO. The initial whereabouts requirements were drafted to provide Anti-Doping 
Organizations (ADOs) with a certain amount of flexibility regarding (a) what whereabouts 
information to collect; (b) what would constitute a missed test; (c) how many whereabouts filing 
failures or missed tests would constitute an anti-doping rule violation (ADRV); and (d) what 
sanctions to impose as a result of such violations. Arising from this discretionary element 
however, was a lack of standardization wherein different ADOs/IFs might not accept or 
“recognize” the findings of another ADO/IF. A further consequence was that athletes from 
different sports could be subjected to different levels of sanctions, which some considered 
inequitable.4
In consequence, new whereabouts requirements were implemented in January 2009 that 
sought to harmonize the existing regulations. More specifically, the changes included precise 
definitions of what constituted an ADRV in relation to whereabouts and missed tests, and what 
potential sanctions could be applied in such cases. WADA’s Athlete Whereabouts Requirements 
are now specified in Article 11 of the International Standard for Testing (IST). According to 
section 3 of the article, concerning “Whereabouts Filing Requirements”, all athletes belonging to 
a registered testing pool – that is, the higher levels of an IF or NADO responsible for the testing 
of its members – are required to file a Whereabouts Filing with their ADO prior to each annual 
quarter. This filing should contain, among other points, the following:
1. A complete mailing address.
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4  WADA (2009) Q&A on Whereabouts, The point should be made, however, that not all differences in sanctions 
ought to be viewed as inequities. As Aristotle’s formal principle of equality runs: treat like subjects in a likewise 
way, and treat difference in different ways.
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2. The consent of the athlete to the sharing of their Whereabouts Filing with other ADOs 
with the authority to test them.
3. For each day  of the subsequent quarter, the full residential address of the athlete (home, 
hotels, etc.).
4. For each day of the subsequent quarter, the name and address of every  location used by 
the athlete for regular activities (training, work, school, etc.), as well as the expected time-
frames for those activities.
5. For the subsequent quarter, the athlete’s competition schedule.5
In addition to this, the Whereabouts Filing also requires athletes to specify, for the 
subsequent quarter, “one specific 60-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day 
where the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location”.6  Athletes 
can update their 60-minute time-slot and their whereabouts at all times by, for instance, emailing 
or text messaging their relevant ADO.
Failure to file one’s whereabouts with the relevant ADO, or filing incorrect whereabouts, 
may  result in a missed test, and, on the current system, three missed tests within any 18-month 
period (starting from the date of the first missed test) constitute a Whereabouts Failure – a 
serious ADRV – and a subsequent suspension of the athlete for a time period of between one and 
two years, depending on the athlete’s “degree of fault”.7  Given that individual athletes are held 
responsible for filing their whereabouts to their ADO, there have been various complaints as to 
the impracticality and severity of the new whereabouts requirements.8  And although WADA 
resists the claims as based on a misunderstanding of its new system, the whereabouts 
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5 WADA (2009) IST, § 11.3.1.
6 WADA (2009) IST, § 11.3.2.
7 See WADA (2009) IST,  § 11.6; WADA (2009) WADC, Montreal: Canada, §§ 2.4, 7.4, 7.5.2, 10.3.3. We note that 
this is a diversion from their application of the “strict liability” principle that operates in the WADC (see McNamee 
and Tarasti (2010) “Ethical and juridical peculiarities of anti-doping legislation”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 36, 
165-9; Soek (2007) The Strict Liability Principle and the Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases, Cambridge, 
MA: TMC Asser Press).
8  Cf. BBC (2009) Athletes Air Issues Over Testing, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/front_page/7892590.stm 
(accessed Apr. 26, 2010).
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requirements have nevertheless generated heated public debate, both popular and academic. One 
of the more serious criticisms of the policy  pertains to privacy, questioning the extent to which it 
may  infringe on individual athletes’ rights to privacy. For instance, the International Federation 
of Association Football (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) jointly 
and officially opposed the whereabouts requirements, arguing not only that the training regimes 
of team-sports differ to a sufficient extent from individual sports to warrant separate sorts of 
whereabouts requirements, but also taking issue with what they see as an infringement of player 
privacy: 	   FIFA and UEFA want to draw attention to the fact that, both on a political and juridical level, the 
legality of the lack of respect of the private life of players, a fundamental element of individual liberty, can 
be questioned.9
Such a post-Millian construal of privacy  as a “fundamental element of individual liberty” 
brings out the potential tension between the whereabouts requirements and individual privacy 
particularly clearly: a requirement to report one’s whereabouts every day  of the year to an official 
body is difficult for many to accede. Given the various vested interests of the parties to the 
debate, however, proper argumentation has given way to rhetorical flourishes, making an initial 
diagnosis more difficult. While the issue is subject  respectively to ethical critique and defense,10 
it may  nevertheless be possible to mount a strong critique of WADA’s whereabouts requirements 
on the basis that they infringe athletes’ legal rights to privacy. We will focus exclusively on this 
latter legal concern, that is, to what extent WADA’s whereabouts requirements are in conflict 
with existing UK and European legislation.
2. A Purported Right to Privacy
While commentators frequently  appeal to a right to privacy, it  is a separate matter to establish 
the legal extent of any such purported right, not least due to the fact that such appeals to 
“privacy” often refer to a multitude of separable concepts. These include the protection of one’s 
private information from public dissemination; the protection of such information from other 
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9 FIFA (2009) FIFA and UEFA Reject WADA “Whereabouts” Rule,  URL: http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/developing/
releases/newsid=1040455.html (accessed May 5, 2010).
10 See McNamee and Tarasti (2010); McNamee and Møller, eds. (2011), Doping and Anti-Doping Policy in Sport: 
Ethical, Legal and Social Perspectives, London: Routledge.
18
forms of misuse (such as undesired targeted advertising); a right to “time off” during which 
certain standard obligations may not  be considered to hold; a right to keep  secrets; or a right  to 
non-interference.
No specific right to privacy currently exists under UK common law. Instead, legal matters 
pertaining to privacy in the UK have been approached through a variety  of legal instruments. A 
number of these pertain to the particular context of WADA’s whereabouts requirements.
First, there is the possibility of seeking remedy within UK common law. Since there is no 
specific common law right to privacy, doing so would instead require bringing an action for 
private nuisance and harassment.
Second, the right  to be free from interference in one’s life and the right to restrict disclosure 
of personal information was traditionally  based on the law of contract. Express or implied terms 
in a contract may oblige the parties to respect privacy and confidentiality. Where the contracts of 
elite athletes contain terms authorizing disclosure and use of personal information or requiring 
respect for privacy of information, the athlete and their employing body are bound by  those 
terms. These contract  terms could include the requirement to disclose whereabouts information 
and would be binding as long as they did not breach the athlete’s rights under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).11
A third, indirect, privacy challenge is also available under European Union law relating to the 
right to work and the right to free time. The status of certain elite athletes as workers means that 
unfair contract terms, restraint of trade, and right to work are subject to the treaties and laws of 
the European Union (EU). As workers, these elite athletes are also entitled to the protection of 
the Working Time Directive 2003 that requires a daily rest period of 11 hours, an additional 
weekly rest period of 24 hours and an annual leave entitlement of 5.6 weeks.12
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11  Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule I, Part I. Council of Europe (1950) European Convention on Fundamental 
Human Rights and Freedoms Rome: Council of Europe (Article 8). The treaty was adopted in Rome on November 
11, 1950 and entered into force on September 3, 1953.
12  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L 299/9, Articles 3, 5 & 7. 
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A fourth potential challenge stems from the Council of Europe normative framework, 
wherein the right to privacy is set forth by the ECHR. The framework of the Council of Europe 
includes the Anti-doping Convention13  and its Protocol,14  affirming potentially relevant 
obligations for member States. The first obliges States parties to adopt appropriate legislation, 
regulation or administrative measures aimed at restricting the availability of banned doping 
agents, including provisions to control movement, possession, importation, distribution and 
sale.15  This provision might be interpreted to entail whereabouts requirements. In this regard 
States should encourage and facilitate sports organizations in the provision of doping controls,16 
by ensuring that they respect the fundamental rights of athletes. The latter requires the States to 
recognise the competence of WADA and other doping control organizations.17  Both the Anti-
doping Convention and its 2002 Protocol provide no enforcement mechanism, although the 
European Court  of Human Rights (ECtHR) can, as usual, interpretatively refer to their norms in 
its decisions.18  It is worth noting that the 2002 Protocol was neither signed nor ratified by the 
UK, although the Anti-doping Convention clearly  enunciates a State’s responsibility for sport 
organization activity. 
Finally, a fifth privacy challenge to the whereabouts requirements is available through UK 
and European data protection law. Briefly, the Data Protection Act 1998, a replacement of 
previous legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1984 and the Access to Personal Files Act 
1987, is a UK Act of Parliament which defines the law on the processing of the data of 
identifiable living people. The Act establishes the legal requirements pertaining to data collection 
and processing, such as the right of access to information being held about oneself, non-
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13 Council of Europe (1989) Anti-doping Convention,  Strasbourg: Council of Europe. It has been signed and ratified 
by the UK on Nov. 16, 1989 and entered into force the March 1, 1990.
14 Council of Europe (2002) Protocol to Anti-doping Convention,  Warsaw: Council of Europe. The treaty has not yet 
been signed by UK.
15 Council of Europe (1989) Anti-doping Convention, Article 4.1.
16 Council of Europe (1989) Anti-doping Convention, Article 4.3c.
17 Council of Europe (1989) Anti-doping Convention, Article 1.3.
18  Ruggiu (2012)“Synthetic Biology and Human Rights in the European Context: Comparison of the EU and the 
Council of Europe Regulatory Frameworks on Health and Environment”, Biotechnology Law Report 31(4), p. 349.
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disclosure of data to third parties unless there is prior consent from the individual whose data is 
being processed (or unless it  is required for certain activities such as crime prevention), a time 
limit on the storage of data, and a requirement on all data processing agencies to have sufficient 
security measures in place.19  The legislation was enacted in order to bring UK law into line with 
the requirements of the European Data Protection Directive of 1995 to protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals with respect to the processing of personal data.20  An athlete 
could argue that the whereabouts requirements were neither consensual, nor in line with 
European legal restrictions on data collection and processing, as well as human rights.
A number of potential avenues are thus available to UK elite athletes wishing to challenge 
the lawfulness of the WADA whereabouts rules. The UK’s membership of the EU and the 
supremacy of its law together with the incorporation of the main articles of the ECHR by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 mean that whereabouts requirements must inter alia comply with UK 
domestic law, European Union law and Human Rights law. We explore the related issues in the 
following section.
3. Challenging the whereabouts rule in law
3.1. Privacy and the UK Common Law
A right to non-interference is an essential component to any purported right to privacy and 
the courts acknowledge that such a right does not  exist  under UK common law. In Kaye v 
Robertson and Another,21  a Sunday newspaper entered the private hospital room of a famous 
actor and took photographs. The court acknowledged that the actor could not bring an action for 
breach of privacy as, “it is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and 
accordingly  there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy”. The circumstances of the 
case led the Court of Appeal to urge the UK Parliament to consider statutory provision to protect 
the privacy of individuals; a request Parliament has ignored up  until now although a cross-party 
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20 Council Directive (EC) 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
21 [1991] FSR 62.
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committee of senior MPs and peers is examining the law surrounding privacy and the rules for 
reporting to Parliament.22
The only way to enforce non-interference in the name of privacy  under UK common law is to 
bring an action for private nuisance or harassment. The courts have established that there must be 
persistent distressing interference for nuisance to arise.23  Persistent unsolicited phone calls to a 
person’s home from men who, due to a misprint  in an advert, thought they were ringing a sex 
line amounted to a private nuisance24  but the mere presence of a building interfering with the 
television reception of a neighbouring property  was not thought serious enough to be a nuisance. 
WADA’s whereabouts requirements and their implementation by UK Athletics (UKA) are not, 
we hold, sufficiently serious or intrusive to amount to a public nuisance. 
It is also very unlikely that the policy amounts to harassment under UK common law. To 
bring a successful action in harassment the athlete would need to show that the behaviour of the 
defendant could have, or did, cause physical or psychiatric illness to the recipient. The behaviour 
does not have to be threatening – persistent pestering would suffice – but the crucial element 
would be the need to show that the behaviour was sufficient to cause a physical or mental 
illness.25 The current provisions of the whereabouts requirements would therefore be unlikely to 
meet this threshold and no action in harassment is likely to be successful.
It can be seen that UK common law does not create a general right to privacy that  upholds 
the right to be free from interference in the way a person conducts their private life.
3.2. Privacy and contract
As there is no specific right to privacy under UK common law, the right to be free from 
interference and the right to restrict disclosure of personal information is based on the law of 
contract. Express or implied terms in a contract can oblige the parties to respect privacy and 
confidentiality. 
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22 Watt (2011) “Twitter revelations prompt MPs and peers to examine privacy rules”, Guardian , 23 May 2011, p. 3.
23 Sewell v Harlow DC [2000] EHLR 122.
24 Pell v Walker (t/a The Media Group) [1997] (Bow County Court, 3 Dec.).
25 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727.
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In Modahl v British Athletic Federation,26  the UK House of Lords held that the relationship 
between an athlete and their national sports federation (UK Athletics) was based in contract. The 
terms of the contract are laid out in the rules of the federation and include the rules of the IF to 
which they are affiliated.
Where the contracts of elite athletes contain terms authorising collection, use and disclosure 
of personal information then the athletes are generally bound by those terms. In Ohuruogu v UK 
Athletics Ltd & International Association of Athletics Federations, Ohuruogu (a professional UK 
athlete) appealed to the Court of Arbitration in Sport (CAS) against a 12-month ban for failing to 
supply accurate whereabouts information.27  The ban was imposed by  UKA in accordance with 
the rules set out by  the IF, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). CAS 
dismissed the appeal and held that as a matter of English law, the relationship  between UKA and 
the athlete was contractual and that although the burden of supplying accurate whereabouts 
information was onerous, the athlete was bound by the terms of that contract, on pain of 
disciplinary measures, to provide them.
What Ohuruogu shows is that  decisions of sports regulatory bodies and their disciplinary 
tribunals are subject to supervision from the courts. For international level athletes CAS has 
supervisory jurisdiction, but given their decision in Ohuruogu it  is very unlikely  that an athlete’s 
challenge to WADA’s whereabouts requirements on the grounds of privacy  would be 
successful.28
A challenge under UK contract  law is also likely to be problematic. Contesting the 
imposition of the whereabouts requirements by  UKA on the grounds of privacy is unlikely to be 
achieved through an application for judicial review.29 A key feature of an application for judicial 
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26 [1999] All ER (D) 484.
27 (2007) CAS 2006/A/1165.
28  Halt (2010) “Where is the privacy in WADA's ‘whereabouts’  rule?”, Marquette Sports Law Review 20 (1), pp. 
267-289.
29 Pendlebury and McGarry (2009) “Location Location Location: the Whereabouts Rule and the Right to Privacy”, 
Cambrian Law Review 40, pp. 63-75.
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review is that it must be in relation to a public law claim against a public body.30  That is, the 
issue raised in an application for judicial review must be a public law issue and the respondent in 
the case must be a public body. Pendlebury and McGarry rightly argue that the UK courts have 
held on numerous occasions that the activities of sports governing bodies are not public in nature 
and so are not susceptible to an application for judicial review.31  This does not mean, however, 
that bodies such as UKA fall completely outside the supervision of the courts. In Chambers v 
British Olympic Association,32  the High Court  confirmed that it had jurisdiction where decisions 
affected an athlete’s right to work. This supervisory  jurisdiction applies even where there was no 
contract between the athlete and the governing body. In Nagle v Fielden,33  the Court of Appeal 
held that where a person’s right to work was in issue a decision of a domestic body that affected 
that right could be the subject of a claim both for declaration and injunction.
Nevertheless, the approach of the courts in exercising this supervisory jurisdiction in relation 
to sports bodies reveals a process that in practice is almost indistinguishable from a judicial 
review. In its analysis of the procedure in Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v Football 
League Ltd,34 the Court of Appeal accepted that the nature of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction 
was just  that: supervisory. The function of the Court  was not to make the primary decision, but 
rather to ensure that primary decision makers (the relevant sport’s regulatory bodies) operate 
within lawful limits. Again, the process is very similar to judicial review where the concern of 
the court is the lawfulness of the rule or decision, the fairness of the procedure, whether any 
errors of law were made and whether the decision fell within the authority  of the sports body or 
their tribunal.
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30 Supreme Court Act 1981, section 31 and RSC 53.
31 Pendlebury and McGarry (2009) “Location Location Location”.
32 [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB).
33 [1966] 2 QB 633.
34 (1997) 9 Admin LR 109.
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When considering anti-doping measures the court held in Chambers,35  that two questions 
have to be addressed. Firstly, in following Nagle,36  does the case concern a right to work and, 
secondly, is the anti-doping measure fair and proportionate.37
In Chambers, an athlete found guilty of doping by the UKA disciplinary  tribunal returned to 
athletics after his ban and qualified for nomination by UKA to be selected as a member of the 
British Olympic team. In addition, however, a by-law stated that any athlete who had been found 
guilty of doping was ineligible for selection for the British Olympic team. The athlete claimed 
that the by-law amounted to an unfair restraint of trade and was illegal. The court dismissed his 
claim as the Olympic Games were an amateur event in the sense that participation in it secured 
no direct prize beyond the medals for the first three places, and thus there was no restraint of 
trade. Furthermore there was no evidence that the by-law was not proportionate.
Although the claim in Chambers largely failed on the basis of the amateur status of the 
Olympic Games, this is unlikely to affect  athletes subject to WADA’s whereabouts requirements 
who are drawn from a pool of elite professional athletes. The athlete would thus need to convince 
a court that the rule applied by UKA was both unfair and disproportionate.
3.3. Right to work, anti-doping and European Union Law
Matters of contract, restraint of trade and right to work in the UK are subject to the treaties 
and laws of the EU. The EU, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice, 
which settle disputes between Member States, institutions, businesses and individuals, have long 
recognised that decisions of sporting bodies concerning restraint of trade or right to work must 
comply with the laws of the EU. 
In Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman (C-415/93),38 
a Belgian footballer sought an order restraining his club and the Belgian football association 
from preventing his transfer to another club in France. The question was whether EC (EEC) 
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38 [1995] ECR I-4921 (ECJ).
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Treaty, Article 48, which guaranteed free movement of workers between Member States of the 
EU, applied to rules governing the transfer system of European football associations. The 
European Court of Justice held that the EC (EEC) Treaty, Article 48, applied not only to rules 
laid down by  public authorities but also to both national and international sporting associations 
who dealt with the employment terms of professional athletes. The transfer fee system was 
incompatible as it prevented the free movement of players who wished to join a club in another 
Member State even after their contracts had expired.
Bosman shows that the decisions of European sporting bodies can fall within the scope of EU 
law but it does not necessarily follow that  they extend to rules on anti-doping measures. In 
Edwards v British Athletic Federation,39  an athlete was banned for four years under IAAF rules 
following a positive drug test. This was two year longer than similar bans in other EU countries 
and the athlete challenged the lawfulness of IAAF's refusal to remit the last  two years of the ban 
under the EC (EEC) Treaty, Article 59. He contended that the ban was an interference with his 
freedom to earn a living as an athlete within the EU.
The court dismissed the action and concluded that EC (EEC) Treaty, Article 59, did not apply 
as drug control rules regulated the sporting conduct of athletes. The fact that the imposition of a 
penalty for transgressors might have serious economic consequences was merely  an incidental 
and inevitable side-effect. The imposition of sanctions was seen as essential to prevent cheating 
and the four year ban was deemed reasonable and proportionate.
The enforcement body  of the EU, the European Commission, took a similar view on the 
status of anti-doping rules when they  considered the position of two long distance swimmers 
suspended by their international governing body  the International Swimming Federation (FINA) 
when they  were found guilty  of doping. The swimmers argued the anti-doping rule was a 
contravention of EU competition law.40  The Commission rejected the complaint on the same 
grounds as the Chancery Division of the High Court in Edwards, namely  that anti-doping rules 
were sporting rules and were not applicable to restraint of trade or right to work.
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However, when the swimmers appealed, the European Court of Justice took a very different 
view. In Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (C-519/04 P),41 the ECJ held 
that as the swimmers were professionals who were paid for their services, any rule that banned 
them from earning a living from swimming fell within the scope of anti-competition and restraint 
of trade laws of the EU. In their final ruling however the ECJ held that the anti-doping measures 
applied by FINA were justifiable and proportionate restrictions that  ensured fair competition, 
protected the health of athletes and preserved the integrity of the sport of swimming.
This decision of the ECJ shows that anti-doping measures can be challenged under European 
Union Law and that a challenge to the whereabouts requirements could be brought on both the 
grounds of disproportionality, and breach of EU law.
Halt42 argues that the best way to challenge the whereabouts policy under EU law is through 
the Working Time Directive 2003, which requires a daily  rest  period of 11 hours, an additional 
weekly rest period of 24 hours and an annual leave entitlement of 5.6 weeks, as noted earlier.43
The applicability of the Working Hours Directive 2003, however, depends on the athlete’s 
status. The directive does not apply to the genuinely  self-employed, only  to employees and 
workers. It is likely  that  many elite athletes would not be classified as employees as they are not 
directly  employed by their sporting body. It is also arguable that  they are not genuinely self-
employed as they are subject to the rules and contractual obligations of their sports federations. It 
is more likely that they will be considered for EU law purposes as “workers”. 
This is a unique EU term that defines those who are not employees but who agree under a 
contract to perform services for another party  who is not a client or customer of any profession 
or business carried out  by the individual.44 Where athletes are considered workers then, they are 
entitled to the protection of the Working Time Directive 2003 and are able to argue that their 
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obligation to provide whereabouts information and be available for testing for an hour a day 
every  day, would mean they were unable to have an uninterrupted rest period, or a weekly  24 
hour rest period, or to take their annual leave entitlement.
3.4. Proportionality of the whereabouts rule
In the case of the whereabouts rule we have demonstrated that UK contract law does not 
offer a remedy to the elite athlete unless the rule amounts to a disproportionate restriction on the 
right to work or breaches the Working Time Directive (2003). In considering proportionality  the 
courts acknowledge that they are obliged to take into account the European Convention on 
Human Rights.45  This is because the ECHR imposes a positive obligation with regard to 
Convention rights and State bodies must act  positively to prevent breaches of the right between 
individuals.46  This fact prompts a consideration of the normative framework of the Council of 
Europe, especially the ECHR, regarding the matter of privacy and the articulation of the 
judgment on its violation.
While there is no right to privacy  under UK domestic law, in the ECHR the right exists and 
falls under Article 8.47 Private life is a broad term not susceptible of exhaustive definition. Article 
8 protects, inter alia, a right to identity, including a person’s physical and psychological 
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integrity,48 and personal development, without any outside interference of the personality  of each 
individual in their relations with other human beings.49  Elements such as, for example, gender 
identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life, ethnic origin, a person’s health, genetic 
features of the individual, and whereabouts information fall within the personal sphere protected 
by the meaning of Article 8.50  In fact, private life does not cover only  the mere “inner circle” of 
the individual, but also “activities of a professional or business nature”. There is, therefore, a 
zone of interaction of a person with others, even in public context, which may fall within the 
scope of ‘private life’”.51 
In this regard, the movement data of a person are at issue. In the whereabouts requirements, 
two types of information of elite athletes are concerned: information coming from biological 
samples52 and individuals’ movement data.53 Both fall within the scope of Article 8 provision but 
with different intensity, and lead to different levels of protection. While the storage and retention 
of human biological samples determines per se a strong constriction of the individual sphere of a 
person and, indirectly, of his relatives, the existence of measures of the surveillance of an 
individual’s movements are, according to the Strasbourg Court, less invasive.54  This different 
gradation of a State’s interference gives rise to two distinct judgment of proportionality  of the 
measures concerned. In fact, while the retention of samples containing the genetic code is of 
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great relevance for the individual (and his relatives) and is likely to be, in itself, sufficient to 
conclude that it amounts to an interference with the right  to the private life of the individual,55 
the systematic collection, use and storage of personal data on an individual’s whereabouts and 
movements interfere to a much lesser extent with private life. This latter instance leads to a 
deeper judgment of proportionality of the interference as according to Article 8.2. 
First, the interference needs to be executed by a public authority  that is empowered to resort 
to relevant surveillance measures. In this regard, according to the Court, although the object of 
Article 8 is to protect the individual against interference stemming from public authorities, in 
addition to this primarily  negative undertaking, the State also has under the ECHR a positive 
obligation to adopt measures to assure the respect of private life even in the sphere of individuals 
between themselves,56  as in the case of sports organizations and elite athletes, regardless of the 
existence of the approval by the person regarded. In this regard, it has been acknowledged that 
“the State cannot absolve itself from responsibility  by delegating its obligations to private bodies 
or individuals”.57  Here a reasonable balance between the competing interests of the individuals 
and the community  has to be struck, and the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.58  Then 
the interference should result  “in accordance with the law”, that is that the measure needs to have 
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some basis in domestic law that should be accessible for the person concerned and its 
consequences should be foreseeable for her/him and be compatible with the rule of law.59 
In this context, the fact that the right to privacy is or is not provided by the domestic law 
could be relevant, although not the only element to consider. Moreover the law must be 
sufficiently clear in its terms to give the person an adequate indication of the conditions and 
circumstances in which the authorities (i.e. the sports organizations) are empowered to resort  to 
any such measure. Then, the “Court must be satisfied that there exists adequate and effective 
guarantees against abuse”.60  This assessment depends on the nature, scope and duration of the 
measure concerned, the grounds required, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and 
supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by  the national law.61  In this instance if it is 
clear that private organizations are authorized to survey  whereabouts and movements of athletes, 
the issue of what role and task of control should be exerted by the State in view of avoiding any 
abuse, that is the issue of the limits and guarantees provided according to the rule of law, remains 
open. In other terms, the Court can examine whether statutory limits on duration of this 
monitoring are fixed in domestic law by distinguishing, first, private life from work life. This 
corresponds with the meaning of the last part of Article 8.2, which provides that the measure 
must be “necessary  in a democratic society […] for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” by identifying, thus, an exemplifying list of 
legitimate aims pursuable by law. If the measure does not possess the aforementioned features 
(in particular, where its aim is not legitimate or the measure exceeds the terms of law), it is 
deemed disproportionate and thus fails the judgment of proportionality by the Court. 
Under UK law the judgment of proportionality  steers the courts’ reasoning in privacy matters 
and consequently reflects the logical framework of that of the ECtHR, especially  as regards the 
existence of a legitimate aim and the judgment of “necessity” of the measure concerned (i.e. that 
the measure must be necessary in a democratic society). The Privy Council in de Freitas v 
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Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing,62 held that when 
considering proportionality the court has to consider whether: 
● the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; 
● the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and 
● the means used to impair the right or freedom is no more than is necessary to accomplish 
the objective.
Proportionality  thus requires a balance to be struck between competing interests and the 
courts recognise that there is an overriding requirement to balance the interests of the individual 
against those of society.63 
In Whitefield v General Medical Council,64  the Privy Council held that a condition attached 
to a doctor’s registration requiring him to refrain from the consumption of alcohol was a 
proportionate response to the pressing social need to protect patients whilst allowing the doctor 
to continue to practice medicine. In this case the proportionality of the provision has been 
carefully  weighed against the level of interference to the article 8 rights of the individual. The 
conditional registration is not  an arbitrary provision that applies to all doctors or even all doctors 
who suffer from depression or drink alcohol. It is a proportionate response to this particular 
doctor’s case. 
It is arguable that imposing a whereabouts rule in contravention of an athlete’s rights under 
the Working Hours Directive 2003 not only affects the athletes work life but also their private 
life in breach of article 8 of the ECHR.65  This interference may  be disproportionate as it applies 
indiscriminately to all elite athletes regardless of intelligence about doping/behaviour or past 
doping offences, and does not have its basis in law.
3.5. Data Protection Law
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European Union laws protecting workers are not confined to rest and holiday periods or 
stipulations of private lives, they also extend to the processing of data. Council Directive (EC) 
95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, and 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and Council on privacy and electronic 
communications provide broad legal protection of a worker’s privacy with regard to the 
collection, use, storage and transmission of personal data.66 The UK implemented these EU laws 
protecting personal information under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.67
To ensure harmonisation of EU data protection laws throughout all Member States article 29 
of Council Directive (EC) 95/46 requires representatives of national data protection 
commissioners to form a working party to ensure uniform EU wide interpretation and application 
of these measures.
The article 29 working party  held that personal data protection extends to monitoring and 
surveillance of workers and includes email use, internet access and, crucially, location data.68 In 
their view such data can only be processed with consent or on the grounds of necessity. 
Furthermore, reliance on consent  must be confined to cases where the worker has a genuine free 
choice and thus is subsequently  able to withdraw the consent without detriment. This would not 
be the case for an athlete who objected to whereabouts data being collected as refusal would 
exclude them from competing in their sport. 
The lawful processing of location data under the whereabouts requirements would therefore 
have to be justified on the grounds of necessity. Necessity  in the context of data processing under 
European Union law is confined to;
● Contractual obligations such as processing payment
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● Health and safety requirements and 
● Compliance with legal requirements
A challenge to the Code could therefore be mounted by an athlete who argued that requiring 
whereabouts information was in breach of European data protection law as its collection and 
processing was not on a genuinely consensual basis and could not be justified on the grounds of 
necessity allowed by European law. The athlete could further argue that European data protection 
laws were breached because the processing of data in this context also amounts to a breach of 
human rights.69
Although a supranational organisation that stands outside the Council of Europe, the EU 
implements the provisions of the ECHR through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Treaty on European Union 2006.70  EU law must be applied in a way 
that is compatible with the articles of the ECHR, which includes data protection law. 
This conclusion is consistent with ECJ case law. According to the Court the provisions of 
Directive 95/46, in particular Articles 6, 1 (b) and (c) and 7 (c) and (e) must be interpreted in 
light of Article 8 of the ECHR. Thus, the publication of personal data (such as employee income 
for bodies subject to control by public authorities and names of the recipients, but we can 
imagine any personal data) can amount to an interference with private life if this information is 
not justified by the economic well-being of the country  as a legitimate purpose as requested by 
the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention.71  In this regard, according to the 
Luxembourg Court  the aim of the free movements of goods and data (Articles 26.2 and 16.2 of 
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the Treaty  on the functioning of the EU) cannot be affirmed in contrast with the EU fundamental 
rights and the provisions of the ECHR. 
The context of application of the norms of the ECHR is also shaped by the other texts of the 
Council of Europe which are relevant with regard to personal data collection. In particular, the 
Council of Europe Convention of 1981 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data (also known as “the Data Protection Convention”),72  which entered 
into force for the UK on 1 Dec. 1987, defines “personal data” as any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual (“data subject”).73  These data can be stored only for 
legitimate purposes provided by  law, usually connected with criminal matters, necessary for the 
prevention of criminal offences under the provision of specific guarantees set by the judicial 
authorities and of limits of duration, the control of Parliament or of other public bodies.74  The 
ECHR and the Data Protection Convention provide exceptions for the interest of the suppression 
of criminal offences and the protection of the rights and freedoms of third parties that may fall 
within the freedom of movement of a person. 
In Copland v United Kingdom the Strasbourg Court held that the monitoring of a worker’s 
telephone, email, internet usage and location while at work constituted a violation of her right to 
respect for private life and correspondence under article 8 of the ECHR and it was irrelevant that 
the data were not disclosed to anybody or used against the worker in disciplinary proceedings. 
This information is the type of data collected under the WADA whereabouts rule. More 
explicitly, according to the Court “collection […] and storage of data concerning that person’s 
whereabouts and movements in the public sphere was also found to constitute an interference 
with private life”.75
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In Copland, the ECtHR acknowledged that the right to respect for a private and family life, 
home and correspondence is a qualified right. According to the second paragraph of Article 8 
interference with the right to respect for private life can only be justified where it is in 
accordance with the law. In Copland the ECtHR held that this element of the article required the 
terms for monitoring a worker had to be explicitly  stated in law and had to be sufficiently clear in 
its terms to give an adequate indication of the conditions authorities may use to justify  this type 
of activity. The UK government argued that the statutes creating public bodies and quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organisations, in this case a Further Education college, 
empowered them to do anything necessary and expedient in the course of their undertakings 
including the collection of monitoring information. The ECtHR rejected this argument as there 
was no domestic law regulating monitoring and so the interference in the Copland case was not 
“in accordance with the law” as required by  Article 8.2 of the Convention. Monitoring is 
therefore likely to be unlawful in the absence of specific laws and regulations to authorise it. 
This conclusion is meaningfully confirmed by the decisions on the collection of data on 
whereabouts and movements of individuals in the case of secret surveillance, stating that “the 
measure should have some basis in domestic law” that must give citizens “an adequate indication 
of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any 
measures of secret surveillance and collection of data”. For these reasons “the following 
safeguards should be set out in statute law: nature, scope, and duration of the possible measures, 
the grounds required to for ordering them, the authorities, competent to permit, carry out and 
supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by national law”.76 
These general requirements of the domestic law cannot be excluded in instances where the 
surveillance is grounded generally on the law of contract. Whether elite sports contexts, with 
their history of anti-doping obligations and the nature of their voluntary  participation thereto, 
constitute a lawful exception is a debatable point. It is nevertheless clear that a statute law should 
exist for anti-doping authorities in the light of elite sports and the whereabouts provisions 
thereof; it should set out limits on nature and duration, and, above all, safeguard measures 
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                      Oskar MacGregor et alii  
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255
76 Shimovolos v Russia, judgment of 28 November 2011 (application no 30194/09), § 67, 68.
36
against abuse even in the case where non-state authorities are at issue, though with the approval 
of the persons concerned. In the absence of such specific provisions, a state of disproportionality 
in the face of the norms of the ECHR might emerge from detailed scrutiny by the Court. It is 
argued that in the absence of such, implementation of the WADA whereabouts requirements is in 
tension with existing anti-doping policy in the UK. Although the UK Government’s adoption of 
the WADC is based on the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti–Doping in Sport (Second World 
Conference on Doping in Sport 2003) and ratification by the UK Parliament of the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport (UNESCO 2005), these international treaty  obligations have 
not been incorporated into domestic UK law. In Ohuruogu,77  CAS held that anti-doping 
measures were implemented under UKA anti-doping rules and the IAAF rules rather than UK 
law. It follows therefore that in the absence of a law specifically  authorising the monitoring of 
athletes' whereabouts may not be in accordance with the law and is in breach of Article 8.
4. Conclusion
WADA views out-of-competition testing as one of the most powerful means of deterrence 
and detection of doping and argues that its whereabouts requirements are the only way of 
achieving an effective deterrent.
The whereabouts requirements, however, give rise to serious concerns over the privacy of 
elite athletes in terms of their right to work, right to a work–life balance, and right to respect for 
a private and home life under EU law and the ECHR (in particular Article 8, the right to respect 
for a private and family life).
Although WADA’s anti-doping code is an international instrument, in Europe its provisions 
must be compatible with the laws of the EU, its Member States and the ECHR, and the European 
Court of Justice has held that decisions of sporting bodies that affect an athlete’s right under EU 
law come under their jurisdiction. Irrespective of its permissibility in the UK, no direct  challenge 
to the WADA whereabouts requirements on the grounds of privacy is likely there. Nevertheless, 
we have argued that athletes may  have grounds to bring a legal challenge through more indirect 
means. As WADA’s whereabouts requirements do not have their basis in European law they 
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appear in breach of elite athletes’ rights under European workers’ rights, health & safety and data 
protection law and may  also, therefore, be in conflict with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human 
Rights Act 1998.
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